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I. Introduction
Nations working together can make a difference. Nations upholding the
rule of law can advance the cause of a fairer world... Yes, the world is a
messy place. But the instruments are there to deal with these problems,
and foremost amongst them is the United Nations itself.1
On the anniversary of the unilateral strike against Iraq, we are no closer to a definitive
understanding of whether the attack is or is not legal. Many critics have, with much
eloquence, made arguments for and against preventive self-defense2 as a normative
concept, and others have scrutinized the text of the relevant Security Council resolutions3
and the United Nation’s Charter with much care to ascertain the technical merits of both
claims. While both approaches have shed much light on this particular debate, it has done
little to place it within its larger context. Iraq (and many conflicts before) should have
been an occasion on which to figure out the only relevant question: how should the
Charter be interpreted? If we accept the premise that the Charter is of constitutional value
in international law, then the legality of any act must not be ultra vires the Charter. This
determination can only be made upon a proper construction of the Charter. While
indeterminacy is inevitable, international law could benefit from some common
framework within which such interpretative choices could be generated and made. It
could benefit from a common methodology of interpretation that places the immediate
controversy within the larger architecture of text, institutional history, practice and – most
importantly – the aspirational values that the UN stands for. It is only this cumulative
approach that affords a more holistic standard against which to evaluate individual acts
by states. It is also this approach that promises to bridge fundamental gaps in ideology –
particularly the dispute over the so-called doctrine of mitigation4 – and allow us to focus
on a way of interpreting the Charter consistent both textually and morally.
The aim of this essay is to elucidate just such a methodology. It will first answer three
important assumptions. One, whether there is a need for an interpretative model. Two,
whether the Charter should continue to be of guiding force in determining the structure of
international law. Three, whether there is any logical way that we can divorce technical
legality and moral legitimacy. To the extent that the answer is yes in the first instance,
yes in the second, and no in the third, we will turn to an explication of how my proposed
methodology works. While I will use Iraq as the driving illustration because of the
salience of many of the issues it forefronts, this essay is not about Iraq per se. It is an
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UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, at his first press conference of 2003, available at
<http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=228>
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By this I mean the attack of a country in anticipation of a threat but which threat has not yet been fully
formed in order to prevent its materializing. See generally, Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of
Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AJIL (2003) 599
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Mainly, S.C. Res 1441 of 8 November 2002, S.C. Res 687 of 3 April 1991, and S.C. Res 678 of 29
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Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq and International Law, 97 AJIL (2003) 557; and Thomas Franck, What
Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AJIL (2003) 8
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attempt at sketching a common basis on which international lawyers may approach
controversies in the future in a manner that is systematic and likely to yield the most
correct answer – or at least options that are consistent with the internal dynamics of the
Charter and the UN.
II. The Need for Interpretation
The practical necessityfor an interpretative model could not have emerged any clearer
than in the aftermath of Al-Qaeda’s attack on American soil. The collapse of the World
Trade Center on September 11, 2001 threatens to murder the rule of international law.
Barely three days after, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the Joint
Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force in which the United States, purporting to assert
its right to self defense against what he determines necessary to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism.5
This resolution was aimed not only at halting the immediate escalation of an attack by
terrorists, but gives carte blanche to the President of the United States to determine how,
when and whom to target in the name of deterring and preventing acts of international
terrorism. This so-called Bush Doctrine,6 extended to Iraq,7 reflects a certain realism8 that
the combined desperation of terrorists, the sophistication of their operations and the
heightened advances in technology available9 present a new threat that demands that it be
dealt with before they are fully formed.
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Section 2(a) of the Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force (September 14, 2001) available at
<http://www.september11news.com/PresidentBush.htm> (emphasis mine.)
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See Michael J Glennon, Forging a Third Way to Fight: “Bush Doctrine” for Combating Terrorism
Straddles Divide Between Crime and War, LEGAL TIMES, September 24, 2001 at 68. In an Address to the
nation on September 7, 2003, President Bush said that the war on terror would be “lengthy and fought on
many fronts.” (see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html) This was a
reiteration of the argument he has made many times since the attacks in 2001 that the US will strike against
any “hostile regime” that sought to harbor or support terrorism in any way. “If you feed a terrorist or fund a
terrorist, you’re a terrorist, and you will be held accountable by the United States and our friends.” See,
Mike Allen, From Both Sides, Promises to fight On: Bush Says the Hardest Part is Ahead,
WASHINGTON POST, November 22, 2001 at A2. In a speech in Washington DC at the National
Cathedral, on September 14, 2001, President Bush emphasized that the US’ retaliation “will end in a way,
and at an hour, of our choosing.”
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Cuba, Syria and Libya are among the three new nations added to North Korea, Iraq and Iran as forming
the Axes of Evil. See, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1971852.stm>
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President Bush says it is “common sense.” See the NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (September 2002), available at <http://whitewhouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>
at page v. Hereinafter, the NSS.
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This was noted on page v of the NSS (ibid). However one may ask if the undoubted tragedy of September
11 has been abused to justify the expanded powers the United States seeks for itself in dealing with
countries it deems hostile to it. It should be noted that the actual attacks could hardly be said to have
exploited any new-fangled technology in a way that would justify a radical shift in security strategy. The
hijacking of planes, while dramatic, is not hitherto unknown. The real worry is that we seem to have
suddenly realized that terrorist cells can hide and operate from almost anywhere. This does not call for a
departure from the traditional restraints on the unilateral use of force against other territories, but rather
resort to other mechanisms such as global frameworks to regulate weapons of mass destructions and
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It ought to be immediately apparent that this position strains traditional reading of
international law. It is quite clear that the United Nations Charter forbids countries to take
it upon themselves to use force to settle disputes unless to resist attack,10 or where
authorized by the United Nations Security Council. That, at least, is the plain reading of
Articles 2(4) and 51 read together. The Bush Doctrine, in calling for the use of force both
unilaterally and beyond the immediacy of any impending attack, strikes at the core of the
scheme of collective security envisaged by the framers of the Charter.11
Bending the law out-of-shape will not only legitimate the already vociferous anger that
fuels terrorism, it risks alienating potential supporters of the ‘war on terror.’12 In his 2000
presidential election campaign, then-candidate George W. Bush said, “If we are an
arrogant nation, they'll view us that way, but if we're a humble nation, they'll respect us.”
Hence, as a practical matter, there is little gain from sustaining a power-based, rather
than a law-based international order.13
This was confirmed by Judge Shahabuddeen who wrote in a separate opinion in Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom:
The question now raised…is whether a decision of the Security Council
may override the legal rights of the states, and if so, whether there are any
limitations on the power of the Council to characterize a situation as one
justifying the making of a decision entailing such consequences.14
This opinion tells us that the consequences of the Security Council’s decisions have
tremendous effect. In maintaining or restoring international peace and security, Art 42
empowers the Council to “take such action as may be necessary.”15 The paradox lies in
radioactive sources, toughened inspection regimes and better intelligence. See generally, Miriam Sapiro,
Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AJIL (2003) 599 at 605-6.
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UN Charter, based on the assumption of states’ reciprocal respect for law as their sturdy shield against the
prospect of mutual assured destruction, in a miasma of so-called realpolitik.
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Mexico proposed an amendment at the San Francisco Conference that would have denied states the right
to “intervene, directly or indirectly, and whatever be the reason, in the domestic or foreign affairs of
another.” 3 UNICO, Restr. Doc. 2, G/7(c), April 23, 1945, at 66. The spirit of this proposal is now captured
in Article 2(7) of the Charter forbidding intervention in matters “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state” unless Chapter VII is invoked.
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were among the unfortunate targets of a terrorist bombing by Jemiah Islamiah operatives in Bali.
13

The economic and political objections to a unilateral order are argued in Franck, What Happens Now?
The United Nations After Iraq, (2003) 97 AJIL 8 at 17-18

14

ICJ Reports 1992 3, at para 32 (Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).

4

the fact that should countries decide to abandon the restraints of international law, not
only does it legitimate rather awesome enforcement measures, it also implicitly
undermines the notion that the Council itself is limited in its mandate to enact such
measures. The rule of law and restraint works both ways. If there is no international law,
then any reign of terror – any status quo – may claim to be ‘legally’ sanctioned.16
And yet, admittedly, the Bush Doctrine has an instinctive allure.17 It is well and good to
be philosophical in academic discourse, but in the real world, each use of force must find
legitimacy in its facts and circumstances.18 When the reality is that you have a rogue
nation, known to be hostile towards you and its neighbors, armed with weapons of mass
destruction, the fact that they have yet to launch a missile will be of cold comfort if you
failed to act – and that country did attack you subsequently. The need to reconcile this
tension, then, between the worry of creating a slippery slope and the need to act sensibly
in the real world is part of the reason we need an interpretative guide.
But, the deeper challenge we must confront – and resolve – lies in an irresistible tension
on principle. On the one hand, if the law does not take into account the concerns of the
countries it seeks to bind, it is not only a violation of its own inherent purpose – the
maintenance of peace and security – it will fail to demand any kind of respect or
adherence.19 At the same time, if the law is merely a reflection of realpolitik, then the law
loses its social function, and becomes no more than a non-normative apology, a post hoc
justification for any actually effective policy.20
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The International Court of Justice’s opinion in Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion of 20 July 1962, 1962 ICJ 163 suggests that this power to authorize action by the UN does not
only vest in the Security Council but may be exercised by the General Assembly when the Council is
stymied by a veto. This was in the context of peace keeping operations and the court made it clear that such
action was legal only “at the request of with the consent of the States concerned.”
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Martti Koskenniemi, The Normative Force of Habit: International Custom and Social Theory, FINNISH
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990), at 95, summarizing why a purely ‘materialistic
conception’ of the law is problematic. It is probably more accurate to suggest that these counterproductive
effects of unraveling international law will be more deleterious for less powerful countries that are likely to
be subject to the tyranny of more powerful ones. However it may not be in the interest of even powerful
countries to have the world in such disorder and unpredictability especially given the interconnectedness of
economic and security interests nowadays. See, Franck, supra, note 10.

17

Some have gone as far as to suggest that terrorists should not be afforded the civility of the procedures of
international law. See, Bernard Gwertzman, US Backs Raid, Regrets Death, NEW YORK TIMES,
November 25, 1985 at A1.
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The question as to why states should ever observe systemic rules, sometimes to the detriment of their
own self-interest, is examined in Thomas Franck, Legitimacy in the International System,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992) edited by Martti Koskenniemi.
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H. Lauterpacht, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. I, at 341-344. Glennon makes the more extreme
argument that the rules of the Charter are irrelevant, especially after repeated violations, significantly by
NATO in Kosovo, and then the US in Iraq. He concludes that the US is correct in asserting that it was not
illegal for it to have bombed Iraq. See, Michael J Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, NEW YORK
TIMES, November 21, 2002 at A37.
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An interpretative model should force us to adopt a sense of humility in avoiding the
exhortation of one principle at the expense of the other, and to strike a balance between
the two competing aims. The fact that we can understand why the law needs to be able to
vindicate our moral intuitions21 must not be a license to either ignore it at the slightest
instance that it does not, or to advocate a reading of the Charter that merely describes
rather than prescribes.22 If so, the Security Council is no longer enforcer and protector of
international law so much as it is a platform for political bargaining.23
It is this exact sentiment that was expressed in a Security Council meeting on the UN’s
role in ensuring the rule of law and promoting justice: “The restoration of the rule of law
is the sine qua non for the sustainable resolution of conflict and the rebuilding of secure,
humane and orderly societies.”24
The study of law is almost always the study of where the limits are drawn.25 Iraq
demonstrates that with crystal clarity. How far can we go in attacking a regime we
believe to possess or is about to possess weapons that will threaten us but which have yet
to actually attack us? Does fear of attack put us within the rubric of Art 2(4)? Such
questions prompt the need for a systematic interpretative guide, one that reconciles our
knee-jerk intuitions with sensible pragmatism, political reality with normative
aspirations.
III. The UN Charter: The Starting Point
While this essay’s proposal of an interpretative model rests primarily on a given
assumption that the Charter is our starting point, the US’ almost-unilateral action in Iraq
has made it clear that this assumption does not rest easy. It has highlighted the question
of whether the UN Charter is of any relevance at all, and hence by extension, whether it
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See generally, Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ – Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics
in International Law, (2002) 65 MLR 159 where he argues a need to balance formalism (recognizing the
need for objective limits) with ethics (recognizing the emotional immediacy of the particular situation) in
what he calls ‘situational ethics.’
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See below, Part VI, where I argue that one of the framing philosophies of the Charter is to act as a sideconstraint on the wanton exercise of power by states.
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This is the argument of Glennon who sees international legalist institutions as “largely epiphenomenal,
that is, reflections of underlying causes. They are not autonomous, independent determinants of state
behavior but are effects of larger forces that shape that behavior.” See, Why the Security Council Failed, 82
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2003) 16 at 30
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Mr Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, at the Security Council
Meeting, S/PV.4835 on “Justice and Rule of Law: The Role of the United Nations,” (September 30, 2003).
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Miriam Sapiro, Advising the United States Government on International Law, 27 N.Y.U.J INT’L L. &
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when you could say yes; and never say yes when you must say no.”
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should continue to be the basis for regulating international behavior.26 There are two
main interrelated answers.
The first is simply a matter of authority. The United Nations and its attendant organs
derive their power from the Charter itself. This was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber
of the ICTY as such:
The Security Council is an organ of the international organization,
established by a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that
organization. The Security Council is thus subjected to certain
constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the constitution
may be. In any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives
of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law.)27
The Charter therefore simultaneously provides for the powers of the Council and the
limits to those powers as well.28 The ICJ has held:
The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance
of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute
limitations on its powers and criteria for its judgment. To ascertain
whether an organ has freedom of choice for its decisions, reference must
be made to the terms of the constitution.29
Given that the US and UK will almost never contemplate forgoing their seats in the
Security Council, and that the Council’s powers derive from the Charter itself, it would
be highly problematic even for them to assert that the Charter is irrelevant.
Further, a constitution is contractual in the sense that it encapsulates an agreement
between the various parties inter se. Given that the international system of law rests on an
essentially voluntary system, it is important to construe what member states consented to,
and what they did not. The Charter is a record of the agreement of the balance between
rights and responsibilities. The corollary of a contract is that every party to it has a veto:
unless she agrees, no contract is formed.30 Therefore, if, on a proper construction of the
Charter, an act was not consented to by the signatories, no one is bound by it.
26

The irony, of course, is that in violating the Charter, the US and its allies risk losing the only institutional
chain it has over other countries.
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Appeals Chamber Decision of the Tadic Jurisdictional Motion, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic a/k/a “Dule”,
Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para 28. Article 7 “establishes”, inter alia, the General
Assembly, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.
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This is “more or less uncontroversial.” See, David Schweigman, THE AUTHORITY OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (2001), at 166
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Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
(1948), at 64. (emphasis mine.)
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Ronald Dworkin, Justice and Rights, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) at 168-9. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980) speaks of the “free consent” of parties in entering into treaties.
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For those who believe in an international order based on law, there is little disagreement
that the Charter is of constitutional status.31 The fact that almost every country seeks to
explain itself by reference to the Charter is not without significance. Most explicitly, it
continues to be argued the strike on Iraq is consistent with the law despite its being
conducted outside Security Council approval.32 The Charter is the fountain of legitimacy;
it allocates powers and rights; it carries both denotative as well as connotative
implications. Of course acknowledging that the Charter is our starting point does not
absolve us from the question of how best to interpret it, and it is a question to which we
will turn shortly.
IV: The UN Charter: Is it Legal or Legitimate?
Article 1 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that one of the purposes
of the United Nations is to bring about the settlement of international
disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law. After 58 years, this purpose is still a very
important one for this Organization.33
That we can speak of justice and international law surely suggests an uncomfortable
dichotomy between our sense of morality and the law. My proposed interpretative model
advances the dialogue by refusing to draw an arbitrary line between legal and legitimate.
Lest we dismiss this as academic indulgence, it is useful to point to two particular
examples where this issue was implied or raised.
Before the strikes in Yugoslavia, several resolutions had been taken condemning the
“appalling atrocities” that were being committed.34 More than half of Kosovo’s
population was displaced.35 It was clearly a violation of international humanitarian law;
31

I use the metaphors of contract and constitution interchangeably because they essentially convey the
ideas I wish to make. It is a contract in the sense that is captures the terms that state parties consent to; and
it is a constitution in the sense that its terms are somewhat elastic and shades differently according to
changes in circumstances in a unique constitutive process – rather than an abandonment and remaking of a
new contract. The idea of the Charter as a constitution seems to be implicitly or explicitly recognized by
many, and appears to be uncontroversial. See, generally, Franck, Is the UN Charter a Constitution?
VERHANDELN FUR DEN FRIEDEN (2003), edited by Frowein, Scharioth, Winkelmann and Wolfrum.
This was also judicially accepted in Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic a/k/a “Dule”: see, supra, note 27
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Particularly S.C. Res 1441 of 8 November 2002, where the Security Council declared Iraq in material
breach of its obligations and afforded it a ‘final opportunity’ to comply with various other resolutions on
weapons inspection. See, Lord Goldsmith, Attorney-General Clarifies Legal Basis for Use of Force Against
Iraq (March 18, 2003), available at <www.fco.gov.uk> (statement in response to a parliamentary question.)
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Mr. Haraguchi, Representative for Japan, at the Security Council Meeting, S/PV.4835 on “Justice and
Rule of Law: The Role of the United Nations,” (September 30, 2003). (Emphasis mine.)
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S/1998/912, 3 October 1998, R/RES1160 of 21 March 1998, S/RES/1199 of 23 September 1998,
R/RES/1203 of 24 October 1998, S/PRST/1999/2, 19 January 1999.
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See, S/1999/99, of 30 January 1999, Annex II, Table 1 for a documentation of the various atrocities
committed.
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the Security Council “emphasizing the need to ensure that all the rights of the citizens of
Kosovo are respected.”36 The moral prerogative was not in doubt. What was doubtful,
was whether NATO’s action, outside of any prior authorization by the Security Council,
was legal.37 Russia, convening the 3988th Meeting of the Security Council, expressed her
“profound outrage” at NATO’s attacks. She argued that
…attempts to justify the NATO strikes with arguments about preventing a
humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo are completely untenable. Not only
are these attempts in no way based on the Charter or other generally
recognized rules of international law, but the unilateral use of force will
lead precisely to a situation with truly devastating consequences.38
Equally adamant, were those in favor of the strikes. The United Kingdom, argued:
In these circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of
overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally
justifiable. The force now proposed is directed exclusively to averting a
humanitarian catastrophe, and is the minimum judged necessary for that
purpose.
It should be noted that while countries supporting the strikes took pains to justify their
actions as a necessary last resort to halt what was an undeniably gross humanitarian
violation, those against the strikes equally took much effort to stress that they were not
blind to the atrocities. Russia, for instance, said, “We certainly do not seek to defend
violations of international humanitarian law by any party.”39 This is particularly
instructive because it demonstrates very clearly the division between those who separate
the law from morality, and those who believe that, in some circumstances, if violating a
law vindicates a moral wrong, it is acceptable.
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S/RES/1199 of 23 September 1998
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NATO’s actions were not the first time a regional organization acted outside or prior authorization.
ECOWAS, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, also intervened in humanitarian disasters. In 1991, five months
after the ceasefire in Liberia, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement commending the efforts
made by ECOWAS to ‘promote peace and normalcy.’ (S/22133 of 22 January 1991) The same refusal to
condemn ECOWAS in Sierra Leone, and in fact, the commendation of its “positive role” (S/RES/1181 of
13 June 1998), again showed the UN’s willingness to recognize the necessity of allowing regional
organizations to take the lead in dealing with humanitarian disasters when it cannot. (We will return to the
point of trusteeship later on.) The difference between NATO’s and EOCWAS’ actions though was that
Liberia and Sierra Leone were members of ECOWAS and hence were subject to the latter’s jurisdiction
under Art 52(1) of the UN Charter. Yugoslavia was not a member of NATO and therefore falls under the
general terms of the prohibition on the use of force under the Charter. See further, Franck, RECOURSE TO
FORCE (2002) at 155-163.
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S.C.O.R. (LIV), 3988th Meeting, 24 March 1999, at 2-3
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Ibid, at 3
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In 2003, Saddam was accused of repressing his own people, aiding terrorism, and
blocking inspections aimed at disarming it of weapons of mass destruction.40 Australia,
one of the supporters of the war, declared as such:
[A]n Iraq with weapons of mass destruction represents a grave threat to
our security and to international security. Our participation in the coalition
is in complete accordance with international law.41
Malaysia responded:
[U]nilateral military action undertaken without the support and
authorization of the Security Council violates international law and the
United Nations Charter. Furthermore, the doctrine of pre-emptive strikes
has no foundation in international law.42
Again, we find ourselves in a situation where some countries speak as if the moral case is
the law, and others speak as if the law is divorced from the moral case. My predictable
answer is that neither position is correct. Law and morality are neither mutually distinct
nor can one substitute the other as a guide of what a country is ‘allowed’ to do. Rather, it
is a constitutive process. Morality informs the law, as much as the law provides stability
and formal consistency to what may otherwise be random assertions of what is ‘just.’
The examples demonstrate the danger of either polarity. Where rules of law are not based
on moral commonsense, they will be observed more in the breach. Simultaneously, we
can understand the reluctance to allow our moral intuitions to trump established rules:43
Those who are involved in this unilateral use of force against the
sovereign Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — carried out in violation of
the Charter of the United Nations and without the authorization of the
Security Council — must realize the heavy responsibility they bear for
subverting the Charter and other norms of international law and for
attempting to establish in the world, de facto, the primacy of force and
unilateral diktat.44
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S/RES 1441 of 8 November 2002
S.C.O.R. (LIV), 4726th Meeting, 26 March 2003, at 27
Ibid, at 8
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At San Francisco, there was concern that peace would be sought at the cost of justice. In fact Netherlands
thought that while they “do not claim to have found the ultimate solution, they have asked themselves
whether a reference to those feelings of right and wrong, those moral principles which live in every human
heart would not be enough.” (Proposals for the Maintenance of Peace and Security Agreed at the Four
Powers Conference at Dumbarton Oaks at 313). In 1945, Ecuador proposed that the supremacy of moral
law [be] the guiding motive which governs relations between states.” (3 UNICO General, Doc 2, G/7(p),
May 1, 1945 at 398. See also, Franck, RECOURSE TO FORCE (2002), at 14-19.
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The harms of such polarity are obvious. As a practical matter, this creates political rifts
between the two camps. This is untenable. In calling for a “unity of purpose,” UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan exhorted the Security Council as such:
Let me conclude by saying that we are living through a moment of deep
divisions, which, if not healed, can have grave consequences for the
international system and relations between States. I appeal to all of you to
reunite around a new resolve to uphold the principles of the Charter. This
is essential if the Security Council is to recover its rightful role, entrusted
to it by the Charter, as the body with primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.45
This was echoed by South Africa who reminded us that “the Security Council is the
primary institution that gives legality and legitimacy to our collective efforts to secure
peace and security in the world.”46 As much as it is reasonable to assert that an automatic
equation between law and morality “threatens to degenerate into a pretence for the use of
power by those who have the means,”47 there is no doubt that a continued persistence on
maintaining a distinction between morality and law, common sense and rules, is, if
anything, only going to put a wider wedge between nations on difficulty issues in the
future by giving them an excuse to hide political animus behind the veil of legal dispute.
But apart from the practical ramifications of not drawing a common ground between
legality and moral justice, there are two interrelated problems on principle. The first is
that this creates a hydraulic effect, where because we are not allowed to refer to our moral
senses in interpreting the Charter, we are forced to read it in a very artificial manner in
order to keep up the pretense. For instance, the UN’s sending in of troops to Congo48 in
order to drive out Katanga separatists. This, despite the presence of Articles 2(4) and
2(7), which, read together, prohibits intervention in matters “essentially domestic.” It is
clear that any assertion that civil wars are not internal is mere sophistry. In 1992, the
Security Council again intervened in the Somali civil war49 in what it called a “unique
situation.” Of course, such action was anything but exceptional. The UN has intervened
in Yemen, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti50 and Sierra Leone. In fact, in 1992 itself,
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for a more interventionist approach

45
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Ibid, at 20.
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Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ – Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in
International Law, (2002) 65 MLR 159, at 167
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S/RES 143 of 13/14 July 1960

49

S/RES 794 of 3 December 1992
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S/RES 940 of 31 July 1994. Uruguay also opposed the resolution, saying that, “We do not believe that
the internal political situation in Haiti projects externally in such a way as to represent a threat to
international peace and security.” See generally, S/PV.3413, S.C.O.R. (LIV), 3413th Meeting, at 5-6. Both
were observers at the meeting, and the resolution (940) was adopted with 2 abstentions (China and Brazil.)
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in An Agenda for Peace,51 where he argued for what he calls “peace-making”, with clear
references to UN involvement towards peace-building in countries torn by civil strife.
It is no doubt admirable that the Council tries to build a future “more secure, more free
and more prosperous.”52 But to justify its actions with reference to a lazy reading of the
Charter only opens the way towards a dangerous path where more countries are tempted
to do so, and is simply wrong in principle. The authority that the Security Council has
derives from the mandate given to it by the Charter. If the Charter can be read in such a
loose and artificial fashion, then it becomes perfunctory. This would violate the principle
of “maximum effectiveness” expressed in the rule ut res magis valeat quam pereat – it is
better for a thing to have effect than to be made void. Every provision is included for a
reason and it should not be made redundant.53
Another problem has been the proposal of what is called the doctrine of mitigation. This
doctrine would allow exceptions to the norms of Charter where there is an extenuating
circumstance. It “does not create law and is recognized as purely circumstantial and
discretionary. [Such] unanticipated factors and extreme necessity may exceptionally
mitigate the consequences of acting ‘off the Charter’ while still leaving the Charter’s
norms in tact.”54 Two bases are put forward. The first is judicial precedence. Here, we are
pointed to the Corfu Channel Case55 where – it is argued – the court recognized certain
extenuating circumstances. However, a closer reading may suggest otherwise:
Certainly, the Court recognizes the Albanian Government's complete
failure to carry out its duties after the explosions and the dilatory nature of
its diplomatic notes as extenuating circumstances for the action of the
United Kingdom. But, to ensure respect for international law, of which it
is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy
constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.56
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It is thus not at all clear that judicial opinion agrees that mitigation is a valid defense. In
this case, the ICJ held that the United Kingdom was in breach of Albania’s sovereignty
despite acknowledging the so-called extenuating circumstances.
The second basis of the doctrine derives from an analogy with domestic law that allows
defenses in order “to bridge the gap between what is requisite and what is generally
regarded as just and moral.”57 There are at least two difficulties with such an analogy.
The first is that this resort to what is “just and moral” is, in contrast with domestic law,
nowhere supported by the text of the Charter. This is crucial because even if we make
allowances for the evolution of international law, they must be supported by reference to
the Charter, which remains the only universally accepted legal basis for the use of force.58
My second objection lies in the difficulty in deciding when this should apply. It is one
thing to say that any exception is open to abuse, but quite a different thing when there is
not even a system by which we can even determine, in any principled manner, when
these exceptions apply. In domestic laws, excuses such as diminished capacity are held to
articulated standards and requirements of proof.59 Morality, on the other hand, is an
extremely broad concept. If morality is to trump in every such situation, then the
processes of the international system will be rendered superfluous.
One might accuse my approach as conflating excuses with justifications. Defenses in
domestic law operate on two-tiers: those that exculpate, or absolutely negate any
illegality (justification); and others that merely excuse the crime without denying the
underlying guilt. It is argued that the doctrine of mitigation does not suggest that the acts
are legal. They are claimed to be excuses. In fact, it is argued that making this distinction
preserves the norm and therefore stops, rather than creates, a slippery slope. My answer
to this is simple. In domestic law, the issue of mitigation applies in reducing the sentence
for an illegal act. In international law, there is no such parallel. If NATO argues that
Kosovo was legitimate, they don’t mean to accept some punitive sanction; they mean to
say: this is something we should not have to accept any legal sanction or responsibility
for whatsoever. In a debate on a draft resolution tabled by Russia condemning the
Kosovo attacks as being outside the law, the US said: “NATO’s actions are completely

construed as support for the doctrine of mitigation. If anything, an earlier part of the judgment found that
the accusation that the US was conducting illegal activities in Iran did not justify or mitigate Iran’s own
wrongdoing. (United States v Iran, Judgment of 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports, 1980, 3 at17-18, para 32; and
39 at para 80-89.)
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justified. They are necessary to stop the violence and to prevent a further deterioration of
peace and stability in the region.”60
It is not clear whether the US representative, Mr Burleigh, used the word “justified” in
the technical sense in which lawyers distinguish between excuse and justification. If he
did, then it shows clearly that he thought the moral necessity of the situation negates the
illegality. But even if he did not mean to make that distinction, it is clear that they see that
the practical effect of mitigation is absolution.61 Therefore, practically speaking, unlike
in domestic law, there is no distinction between excuse and justification.
No one suggests that basic notions of morality and justice are unimportant. Indeed, one of
the important controversies at San Francisco was precisely over the unease that many
delegates felt in a system that seemed to prize peace over all else. Australia, while
emphasizing the priority of principles of non-aggression and state sovereignty, said, “At
the same time, we recognize that in the course of time, adjustments in the existing order
may become necessary, not so much for the preservation of peace as for the attainment of
international justice.”62 But respect for the international system will also diminish if we
attempt to secure justice by undermining the very foundation we seek to support. The
point is this: if we are to uphold moral values, we must find the means within the
structure and words of the Charter, and not outside it. It is wishful thinking that such
broad exceptions can still leave the Charter norms in tact.
V. A Proposal of an Interpretative Model
The US’ strike against Iraq opened our eyes to the very real practical and philosophical
issues that continue to plaque our system of international law. It revealed the failure of
nations to seek common ground and exposed the sharp division between them. There is a
need to balance pragmatism with idealism, and to vindicate the purposes of the Charter
without setting a dangerous precedent. A failure to approach the interpretation of the
Charter with sensitivity to these issues, and falling into the trap of divorcing the twin
concepts of legality and legitimacy, can only spell even more angst and division. An
interpretative model, then, must reject extremes. While paying attention to the text, it
must be cognizant of its relationship to the real world; and while attempting to secure our
60
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moral intuitions, it must avoid reducing the Charter to an instrument of post-hoc
rationalization. The interpretative model that I propose involves a series of steps that
forces the decision-maker to confront the multidimensional nature of a truly thorough
inquiry that will address the concerns of the foregoing analysis.
A. Text, and Changing Circumstances
If there is one lesson that Iraq taught us, it may well be that we are fighting new battles
with old rules. While the attack on Iraq was itself justified on narrow technical readings
of various resolutions by the Security Council, Iraq did represent a new moral paradigm.
That paradigm was this: short of an actual armed attack (which would justify retaliation
under Art 51), how long must a country wait for a threat to materialize before preemptive
measures may be taken against it?63 The Bush Administration’s initial answer was
contained in the NSS as follows: the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction –
and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even
if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.64
This, of course, is hardly what the words of Art 51 allow on its face. The question for us
is the extent to which we believe that our interpretation of the text should be flexible
enough to allow the Charter its proper role as a living constitution. As Kofi Annan
reported, the demands we face also reflect a growing consensus that collective security
can no longer be narrowly defined as the absence of armed conflict.65
A constitution assumes that the parties have contracted with reference to the possibility of
change, and the role of construction is to ask what might have the parties agreed had they
known that this would happen.66 So in determining whether evidence of an impending
attack would justify a state taking unilateral pre-emptive action, we need to put ourselves
in the shoes of the framers of the Charter and see if this would have been their intention.
This is sometimes known as the doctrine of original intent, strict constitutionalism or
fidelity to the framer’s intent:
The whole aim of construction is to discover the meaning, to ascertain and
give effect to the intent, of its framers and the people who adopted the
Constitution. The necessities which gave rise to the provision, the
controversies which preceded, as well as the conflicts of opinion which
63
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were settled by its adoption, are matters to be considered to enable us to
arrive at a correct result. The history of the times, the state of things
existing when the provision was framed and adopted, should be looked to
in order to ascertain the mischief and the remedy. As nearly as possible we
should place ourselves in the condition of those who framed and adopted
it.67
At the same time:68
Legislation, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its
general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form
that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is
peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments,
designed to meet passing occasions. They are designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.
The ICJ has also commented as such:
In the interpretation of a multilateral convention…which sets before itself
certain sociological or humanitarian goals, the task of interpretation should
be guided by the object and purpose which the Convention sets before
itself. A literal interpretation, using strict methods of anchoring
interpretation to the letter, rather than to the spirit of the convention,
would be inappropriate.69
The fact that the Charter contains no provision for a state to withdraw (unlike its
predecessor, the League of Nations Covenant) suggests that the provisions should be read
in order to make sense for perpetuity.70 Indeed, whatever one’s conviction may be in this
area, it is undoubted that the practice of the member states has leaned towards the latter.71
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Take, for instance, Article 27(3) which provides that all non-procedural matters “shall be
made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the
permanent members.” A plain reading of Article 2(7) should be enough to realize that
abstentions from the permanent members should, unless one stretches the imagination,
mean that the resolution is “vetoed.” Yet, the Council has adopted some 319 resolutions72
where there has been an abstention. The ICJ has endorsed this practice in the Namibia
Advisory Opinion.73 Other examples of the Charter evolving include the starting, and
then the expansion, of the concept of peace-keeping which is nowhere mentioned in the
Charter. But under the mandate of a fictive “Chapter 6½” of the charter, invented to mop
up after the Suez expedition in 1956, countless peacekeeping operations have been
undertaken, and their scope has been steadily widened.74
The underlying premise of such evolution is that there is very little reason why we should
be held ransom to the writers of any given treaty, precisely because it is undoubtedly the
case that the balance those writers struck would have been because of the immediacy of
the circumstances they faced, and wanted to cure. The overwhelming emphasis on nonviolence was primarily the result of the treaty being negotiated not quite yet at the end of
the Second World War and there were threats of another round of conflict.75
Given the tension between the need to ensure against running against the express
intentions of the parties to the Charter, and the need to evolve, how do we decide which
terms are pliable are which are not? The US Supreme Court has said:
When the provisions of the Constitution, in grant or restriction, are
specific, so particularized as not to admit of construction, no question is
presented…But where constitutional grants and limitations of power are

Charter. In doing so, it reminded itself of Art 109, which provided for a General Conference of the
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set forth in general clauses, which afford a broad outline, the process of
construction is essential to fill in the details.76
This method of interpretation makes a lot of sense. If the framers wanted to insulate
certain provisions against change, they would have made it so specific that there was only
one way to read it. But where words like “peace” and “aggression” are used, it is not
inconceivable that it was their intention that future generations be able to interpret these
according to the changing contexts. It would be fair to impose such an interpretation on
the signatories to the Charter because even though they may not have known what the
exact interpretation would end up being, it would still, on balance, have been in their
interest to agree to this flexibility.
B. INTERPRETING AMBIGUITY
Most controversies arise precisely because the provisions in the Charter are worded
broadly, and are thus likely to be capable of being understood different from when it was
formulated. For example, in the context of Iraq - and the general issue of preventive selfdefense that it raises – much argument has been made in favor of a more flexible doctrine
that acknowledges the reality that threats posed to nations no longer take the form of
visible troops marching in the horizon but in the form of potentially lightning-quick
strikes, involving weapons of mass destruction. The impracticality of waiting for a firststrike before retaliating is an oft-quoted justification for a more expansive reading of Art
51, which otherwise offers a relatively limited right to self-defense.
The starting point in interpreting how to proceed when it is not clear that the framers
intended only a specific meaning is to distinguish between institutional rules (that
provide a justification for a decision by some particular and specified institution) and
background rules (that provide a justification for decisions in the abstract).77 The
distinction may be illustrated as follows.78
Institutional rules are fixed by constitutive and regulative rules that belong distinctly to
that institution. No one can claim an institutional right by reference to some general sense
of morality. If we recall the discussion on the doctrine of mitigation, we can now see why
I objected to it. It is for the simple reason that institutional rules would be rendered
superfluous if every time there was a decision to be made on an issue, institutional rules
will defer to some general and nebulous idea of what is right and wrong. But the theory
of institutional rules goes further. It says that they can only be recognized by constructing
the character of the institution by asking a series of questions that looks at its history and
established norms. A decision in a hard case must be brought within a general theory of
why, in the case of this institution, the rules create or destroy those particular rights in
question. The situation is somewhat more subtle especially in an Organization as
complex as the UN. There is not only one institutional rule; there are many. And in
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making a decision as to whether an act is legal, one would have to consider these various
(sometimes seemingly contradictory) rules together – and decide where one rule ends and
another starts.
However, apart from a horizontal association between institutional rules, there needs to
be a vertical association between institutional and background rules. Institutional rules
may need to be trimmed, aligned and positioned in order to “fit” within the larger moral
canvass that the particular institution supports. This constitutive interaction is necessary if
we believe in an ethically-drenched interpretative model, one where law and morality
ought to be – to some extent – one and the same. A constitutional theory is therefore
formulated by referring alternately between background theory and institutional detail.79
Let me illustrate this by reference to one justification that was proffered for the invasion
of Iraq: the human rights situation. Given the general prohibition on the use of force
unless to restore “international peace and order,” would the UN have had the authority to
intervene solely on the basis of human rights violations?80 Well, it is not clear. This is a
situation in which the rules are not so particularized as to deny any reinterpretation. An
analysis of institutional rules reveals that exceptions to the prohibition against force are
drafted narrowly. Once we start automatically equating human rights abuses with
“international peace and security” it blows apart any meaningful right to sovereignty and
puts the Security Council in the unenviable position of having to sit in judgment of all
domestic arrangements. And, neither the text nor the history explicitly recognizes a right
to act in cases of human rights abuse. On the other hand, there is an instinctive sense that
in some circumstances – surely – the lives of humankind must be valued more than
sovereignty concerns. Thus the question becomes whether we can fit our institutional
rules within some background theory. In other words, if we are going to be able to deal
with such abuses, we have to find a way within the Charter itself.
Here, the Charter clearly states as one of its purposes respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms: We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to…reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights…and for these ends…to maintain international peace
and security. It is certainly arguable therefore that the notion of “peace and security” is
not purely military, and may in fact have been regarded as having an instrumental value
in ultimately protecting the rights of the individual.81
This process of going back and forth in determining the interpretation of a troublesome
provision is much more difficult in reality. Even within the background theories or within
79
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the institutional rules, there will be many, all of which need to be referred to in order to
generate an answer for such hard cases, and to ensure that the part is consistent with the
whole. So the process is not simply bouncing between one background rule and one
institutional rule, but quite probably, between several. This complexity is probably what
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had in mind when he said:
The sovereign States that drafted the Charter over a half century ago were
dedicated to peace, but experienced in war. They knew the terror of
conflict, but knew equally that there are times when the use of force may
be legitimate in pursuit of peace. That is why the Charter’s own words
declare that “armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest”.
But what is the common interest? Who shall define it? Who will defend it
— under whose authority and with what means of intervention? These are
the monumental questions facing us as we enter the new century.82
One might object that if we end up with the same conclusion, why bother going through
this process. The point in doing so is because it forces the reader to look first and
foremost to the words of the Charter. If we accept the contractarian analysis above, the
only way we can impose conditions on member states is if we are able to point out that,
on a proper construction of the Charter, this is what they signed on to. Therefore the
analysis begins not from some general conception of what is good and bad, but a careful
consideration of what the institutional rules are. We look at the words of the Charter, and
ask ourselves if it admits of any ambiguity. If there is none, then that must be the end of
the inquiry. If there is doubt, or if it is in fact obvious that certain conceptions are meant
to change with time, then we must first construct the institutional rules by reference to
history, norms and text. Sometimes, this may be sufficient to yield a clear and sensible
result. Other times, where the result appears awkward or counterintuitive, we see if we
can fit these institutional rules within some background theory. The UN is framed by
such underpinning philosophies, and answers should be sought within these confines.
There is another reason for this constitutive process of referring back and forth.83 An
alternative for reading the relationship between, say individual rights and national
sovereignty, might be to suggest that the sovereign state is a device that protects
preexisting rights.84 What the method I propose does is to argue that a person is
constituted as a rights holder of a certain sort only within the context of a specific social
relationship. If we elevate this to the international system, what it means is that countries
maintain rights only insofar as the matrix of institutional rules and background theories
allow. If a state asserts a right to use force, that country has to justify it with reference to
that matrix, and not by resort to any autonomous or free-standing right.85
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We now turn to ask: how do we use this method of interpretation to decide if the strike on
Iraq is legal? Iraq poses two interesting questions. One, is whether the US was acting
properly when it took it upon itself to enforce what it believed were Security Council
resolutions authorizing such action. Two, is whether, in a larger sense, notwithstanding
those resolutions, did the US have a right to attack Iraq on the grounds of either
preventing the possible threat of Saddam acquiring and using weapons of mass
destruction against her, or on humanitarian grounds. I will first begin by elucidating those
institutional rules pertinent to answering those questions; and then move on to see if the
result we yield fits within the general background theories that underlie the UN.
Predictably, the text of Charter – as expected – does not give us an explicit answer either
way, and that is why we need to embark on this interpretative mission.
VI. Institutional Rules
Our attention thus turns to what institutional rules govern the use of force, particularly in
situations like Iraq’s. In this case, we focus on three: the general prohibition on the use of
force and its exceptions, the procedural and substantive requirements in the exercise of
force, and finally whether there is any truth to the idea that a ‘coalition of the willing’
may use force on its own prerogative on what I call the trusteeship argument. The
definitions and limits of these rules are constructed by looking at the words of the
Charter, and examining whether and how institutional practice, norms and history shed
light on the text.
A. Prohibition on the Use of Force
The focus of any serious discussion on the use of force begins with understanding how
wide the prohibition on the use of force is. This is captured in Art 2(4). The words are
clearly aimed at precluding almost any unilateral recourse to force.86 The provision uses
the word “force” rather than “war”, making a deliberate departure from the League of
Nations Covenant and the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928. “Force” presumably would take
care of aggression short of an actual declaration of war. By way of further elaboration,
the Declaration on the Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States adopted in 1970,87 which is clearly aimed at fleshing out the
terms of the UN Charter, purports to “recall the duty of States to refrain in their
international relations from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion
aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State.”88 The
language is strikingly similar to Art 2(4). I would suggest that “force” therefore includes
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not only military force, but other coercive acts.89 Indeed it would be very strange to
prohibit only military force but allow other forms of coercion. If the underlying principle
is to protect the integrity of the nations, there is really no reason to suppose that there
should be any distinction between military and non-military aggression. So, at the most
general level, the prohibition on force captures a wide range of situations.
Of more concern however is whether a state violates the Charter where it does not use
force but allows other non-state actors to. This is the Taliban situation – where a country
may allow itself to be the breeding ground of terrorists or sponsor terror networks. This
was also one of the many justifications proffered by the US when it linked Saddam
Hussein with Al-Qaeda operations. While the Charter is not clear on this point, we can
look to other treaties as indicative of what the international community has accepted as
practice and norm in order to inform our interpretation of the Charter. For instance,
Article 1 of the Friendly Relations Declaration says:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting
or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present
paragraph involve a threat or use of force. (emphasis mine.)
This would strongly suggest an interpretation that something short of a direct
participation in unlawful aggression is nonetheless violative of the Charter. One may try
to squeeze this into the meaning of “use of force” against the sovereignty of another state,
or more realistically, as one of the unenumerated prohibitions under the “or in any other
manner inconsistent” clause of Art 2(4). If we take this as evidence of institutional norms,
then it can be confidently stated that even indirect aggression constitutes a violation of
Art 2(4) of the Charter.90 Therefore, assuming it is true that Saddam was selling weapons
or aiding in other ways the operation of Al-Qaeda, notwithstanding Security Council
resolutions, Iraq would have been in violation of the Charter. But this does not end our
inquiry because even if Iraq violated the Charter, it still remains to be seen if the United
States was proper in acting the way they did.
The strike itself – of course – was a “use of force” and so falls easily within the rubric of
Art 2(4) and 51. But what about the explicit threats of a military response before the
strikes? An often ignored term is what is meant by the “threat of force.” It is a well
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accepted fact that threats of force are made every day particularly by militarily stronger
countries. Negotiations with Afghanistan and Iraq were accompanied by threats of
force;91 and it is at least arguable that the threat of force may sometimes be used as a
bargaining chip which in fact preempts an escalation of military aggression. However,
given that the scheme of the UN is collective security vested in the organs of the UN,
there is no reason why first recourse should not be had the Security Council92 and
therefore why individual nations should see fit to either speak on behalf of, or in place of,
the Security Council. It is thus submitted that if unilateral threats of force are intended to
elicit political gain, it should be illegal.93
What about the actual strikes? To illustrate how difficult it is to assert the right to use
force, the Corfu Channel Case of 1949 is instructive. The United Kingdom had violated
Albanian waters in order to remove mines after an incident which killed fifty four British
sailors. In rejecting the defense of self-help, the ICJ held, in no uncertain terms:
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to the
most serious abuses and as such cannot, whatever may be the defects in
international organization, find a place in international law.94
This almost absolutist stand denies the right of countries to use force even to secure its
legal rights. In 1976, commenting on Israel’s rescue action in Entebbe, Uganda, the US
Representative in the UN Security Council suggested that a “temporary breach of
territorial integrity” would “normally be impermissible under the Charter of the United
Nations.”95 The Corfu Channel Casemay also be useful in interpreting the qualifying
words of Art 2(4), which appear to accept the legality of force where it does not in fact
impinge on the territorial integrity of a country or political independence of a state, or is
consistent with the purposes of the Charter. Does this mean that surgical strikes made at
another country, say in order to incapacitate terrorist training camps, are legal?96 What
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about military action taken to vindicate the purposes of the Charter, such as may be the
case in humanitarian interventions?97 If there are such exceptions, do they conform to any
procedural or substantive limitations? The answer is unclear. While it has the potential to
be a powerful legal basis to halt atrocities, it should also be limited. This is because Art
2(4) should be read together with Art 51 which talks of the right to self-defense only in
cases of an armed attack, and only up until the Security Council takes action. Given that
Art 51 is generally accepted as the only explicit exception to the prohibition on the
unilateral use of force, and is itself extremely limited, it may be suggested that the
Charter, as a whole, should not be interpreted in a manner that would allow an openended right to unilateral action. Furthermore, it makes little sense to draft such an
ostensibly narrow exception in Art 51, only be rendered otiose by Art 2(4). Art 2(4) was
an explication of what is not allowed, rather than what is.
So we know that the general prohibition on force is wide and almost absolute. Do the US’
actions against Iraq, then, fall within the articulated exception of Art 51, which allows
unilateral action when a country is being attacked, and where the Security Council has
not acted on the situation? The starting point is the interpretation of what an “armed
attack” means.98 An appreciation of what “necessity” means99 can only be had in relation
to what the words “armed attack” intended to convey. In Nicaragua, the Court said:
In the view of the Court, this is to be understood as meaning not merely
action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also the
sending by a State of armed bands on to the territory of another State, if
such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been
classified as an armed attack had it been carried out by regular armed
forces…The Court does not believe that the concept of "armed attack"
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includes assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or
logistical or other support.100
Thus, while provision of such support constitutes a violation of the Charter, it would not
justify a unilateral strike. This is an extremely high standard. In order to act in selfdefense, that state has to actually initiate and coordinate an attack. Therefore it seems that
countries that sponsor terrorism (like Iraq) cannot be subject to unilateral strikes.101 More
importantly, the reference to an “armed attack” would be an unnecessary double
emphasis except if it was meant to underline the need for an attack of appreciable scale
and effect. This reading would bring us closer to the standards of the Caroline case which
is often cited as the limits to anticipatory self-defense, requiring that the situation has to
be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.”
The question that interests us is whether these standards admit of any possibility of
change.102 Our first duty is to the words of the Charter and institutional norms. I cannot
see how the words are ambiguous. If a country is directly actively complicit in the attack
of another country through terror networks that it supports, then there is no question that
the victim may defend herself upon an attack until such time the Security Council takes
over.103 But where this is not the case, then recourse should be had to the Security
Council. The almost absolute general ban on the use of force discussed above also
emphasizes a limited reading of the exception.
We should look at Resolution 1368 in relation to Afghanistan, which purported to
authorize the US’ right to self-defense. In doing so, it achieved two remarkable feats. The
first is that it extended its jurisdiction to non-state actors, showing its commitment to deal
with terrorism.104 The second – and most important – is that by doing so, the implication
is that the US would otherwise not have had legal authority to attack Afghanistan based
on the Nicaragua holding (ie a regime such as the Taliban, which did no more than
provide assistance to Al-Qeada, is not guilty of an armed attack.) This resolution was not
an affirmation of any inherent right of the US to attack, but an authorizationto act. Thus,
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institutional norms confirm that while support for terrorism constitutes a violation of
international law it cannot be enforced unilaterally.105 If that were so, it would render the
clear intention to put the Security Council as the centerpiece of the collective security
scheme of the UN redundant.106
There may be a very small and limited right to strike back in cases of terrorist attacks in
order to halt the continuation of further attacks. This was Israel’s argument in an
emergency meeting called for by Syria after the former retaliated for a suicide bombing:
Israel’s measured defensive response to the horrific suicide bombings
against a terrorist training facility in Syria is a clear act of self-defence in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter… And it is designed to prevent
further armed attacks against Israeli civilians in which Syria is
complicit.107
The Security Council did not pass a resolution condemning Israel’s action, but did the
pragmatic thing by asking both Israel and Syria to practice restraint. This may be a
recognition of the right of countries to protect themselves when under an actual attack,
even against non-state actors. This makes sense.108 But it should not be taken to mean
that there is a general right to launch a sustained military campaign against another’s
territory by the mere fact of its harboring terrorists.
From the discussion above, it appears that the right to self-defense is really a concession
to practicality. If a country is under heavy attack, it should – of course – be able to defend
itself. If it comes from a non-state actor, the requirement of proportionately means that it
should only aim to incapacitate a particular facility and not ‘take out’ the whole country.
Outside of these exceptions, the real recourse is to the Security Council. If there is no
imminent threat, and where recourse to diplomacy is possible, the Israel-Iraq example in
1981109 - Iraq was at least four years away from an operationally-ready nuclear facility
when Israel attacked it – the words of the Charter and institutional norms clearly preclude
any expanded notion of self-defense. As such, the US was wrong in attacking Iraq for any
supposed complicity with Al-Qaeda.

105

In Nicaragua, the Court said, “While an armed attack would give rise to an entitlement to collective
self-defense, a use of force of a lesser gravity cannot produce an entitlement to collective self-defense.”
Supra, note 100
106

Glennon argues, correctly in my opinion, that a general and sustained military campaign on a country
that hosts terrorists is also unproportionate per se. Supra, note 101, at 545. Therefore it needs to be
authorized by the UN Security Council.

107

S.C.O.R. (LIV), 4836th Meeting, S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003, at 7

108

Even so, there were several countries which expressed regret at Israel’s actions. Notably the United
Kingdom, while saying that Israel’s actions would undermine the peace process, stopped short of calling it
a violation of international law. The French did however characterize it as “an unacceptable violation of
international law and the rules of sovereignty.” (Ibid, at 10)

109

Franck, RECOURSE TO FORCE (2002) at 49

26

But the US’ justification goes further in suggesting that it had a right to preventive selfdefense against Iraq because of its aggressive history and its alleged possession and
manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. In arguing for a general concept of selfdefense that involves taking action even when removed from the immediacy of any
attack, much emphasis is placed on what it means that states have an “inherent” right to
self-defense. One view is that the right to self-defense derives from natural law and
cannot be limited by positive law. Closely associated with this view is the idea that the
law is necessarily subordinate to power. These schools of thought are wrong. Firstly, as
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht wrote, “such a claim is self-contradictory inasmuch as it purports
to be based on a legal right and at the same time, it disassociates itself from regulation
and evaluation of the law.”110 Secondly, if “inherent” imports natural law or customary
law (which envisages a relatively broad right to self-defense), it is quite clearly
inconsistent with the part of Art 51 that purports to terminate the right of self-defense
once the Security Council has taken measures to stem the crisis and requires any use of
force is to be reported immediately to the Council. Clearly, the right is subordinate to
positive law and is very limited. I would also suggest that institutional practice affirms
this. In 1990, Resolution 678 authorized member states to use “all necessary means” to
drive out Iraq from Kuwait. At the same time, it also “reaffirmed” Resolution 661,111
confirming Kuwait’s authority to engage in individual and collective self-defense. More
than just evidence that it is possible for UN action and self-defense to be taken
concurrently,112 it is submitted that this reaffirms the fact that Kuwait may not otherwise
have this “right” once the Council acted. In Resolution 1368, adopted after the September
11 tragedy, the Council – once again – authorized self-defense.113 Some believe this is a
contraction in terms, the argument being that since the right is inherent in the victim, the
Council should not be able to authorize this.114 I suggest there is no contradiction.
Instead, I would argue that these two examples demonstrate that the word “inherent” has
a much more limited meaning than one might expect. If this is the case, then clearly all
that the “inherent” right entails is a right to defend oneself from destruction out of the
sheer necessity at that moment in time when it is under attack. Rights of nations are not
prior to the Charter, but instead derives from the unique legal and political arrangement
that the Charter dictates. The ICJ said as much in Namibia:
It first recalls that the entry into force of the United Nations Charter
established a relationship between all Members of the United Nations on
the one side, and each mandatory Power on the other, and that one of the
fundamental principles governing that relationship is that the party which

110

H Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (1933) at 179-80

111

S/RES/661 of 6 August 1990

112

Franck, RECOURSE TO FORCE (2002) at 49

113

S/RES 1368 of 12 September 2001

114

Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, (2001) 95 AJIL 839 at 840

27

disowns or does not fulfill its obligations cannot be recognized as
retaining the rights which it claims to derive from the relationship.115
We should be careful of admitting recourse to notions of natural justice unless there is a
very good reason to. In the case of self-defense, there is a perfectly reasonable way to
interpret the word “inherent” without doing violence to the express words of Art 51, and
the general scheme of the Charter which places the Security Council at the center of
international peacekeeping. Thus, it is submitted that the general principle of preventive
self-defense is not legal, and cannot be used to support the unilateral strike against Iraq.
B. The Requirement for Standards
In assessing the legality of any unilateral action in self-defense, and particularly in Iraq’s
case, two questions are raised. Is the unilateral response by that country justiciable and if
so, how do we determine if the response was “necessary.”
It is not always uncontroversial that it is part of the institutional process that state actions
even in self-defense should be accounted for. If one holds the belief that the right to selfdefense for instance is “inherent” it is possible for one to hold the belief that the exercise
of such a right is non-justiciable.116 Professor Franck comes very close to this conclusion.
He says that the inherent right being preserved in Article 51 is clearly that of a victim
state and its allies, “exercising their own, sole judgment in determining whether an attack
has occurred and where it originated.” However, he goes on to qualify this by saying that
evidence does play a role, but only after the right of self-defense is exercised, and not
before. I certainly agree that it is absurd to require a state that is facing an attack to
exercise its right to self-defense only after its representative has made a presentation of
facts to the UN Security Council, and to obtain its prior authorization, but that does not
seem a particularly illuminating point to make. If the right to self-defense is a concession
to practical necessity – the inability to wait before resorting to force as a last measure to
preserve its territorial integrity – then obviously the right is exercisable immediately upon
attack. But does this mean the obligation to provide proof arises only after the response is
complete? And if this obligation arises only after, does this mean that the Security
Council or the International Court of Justice can never intervene in the middle of a
purported exercise of self-defense?
I suggest not. A careful reading of the Charter demonstrates otherwise. For one, the
Security Council is charged with the right and obligation to make determinations of
threats to peace or unlawful aggression. There is nothing to suggest that this
determination should take place only after an attack has occurred. Furthermore, Article
51 makes it explicit that:
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…measures taken by Members in the exercise of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security. (emphasis mine.)
The requirement to present evidence clearly arises from the moment of the exercise of the
right of self-defense. The fact that the Charter recognizes the possibility of Council’s
actions terminating the right to self-defense implies that the legal obligation to make such
information available so as to enable the Council to make a determination of the situation
arises immediately. As the ICJ said in Nicaragua, it is often the victim that is most aware
of the facts, and likely to want to draw attention to its plight anyway. To allow otherwise
is to permit such countries to act in their own discretion, with no recourse until the attack
is over. By that time, the infrastructure of the other country may have been illegally
destroyed, or the innocent party would have struck back in its claim to self-defense,
thereby escalating the violence. Either situation is clearly unpalatable. Therefore
assuming that the US can invoke the self-defense exception, it is still open to scrutiny.
The next question in relation to any assertion of self-defense, and particularly with Iraq,
is the necessity of the attack, which then turns on what we mean by “imminent.” The
words of the Charter are silent. Hence, we need to look at the institutional norms and
practices. In the original formulation of the classic Caroline test, there needed to be “a
necessity of self-defense, instance, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation.”117 The emphasis is, of course, on the fact that there needs to be
“no moment for deliberation,” which suggests that the attack should not only be
imminent but also immediate. William Taft’s interpretation that this merely indicates
“urgency rather than just the timing of the response”118 severely underestimates the
stringency of the Caroline test. The strong condemnation of Israel’s attack on the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in 1981 clearly indicates that even though it may have been ‘urgent’ for
Israel to preempt Iraq’s nuclear-weapons capability, it was not an immediate concern and
hence failed the test of necessity.119 Therefore even assuming that the US’ assessment of
Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction was accurate, it made no effort at
showing that some sort of attack was going to be immediate. What is labeled “preventive
self-defense” would definitely fall outside the threshold since, by definition, it is not a
response to an immediately impending attack. This certainly accords with the general
tenor of the Charter in ensuring as limited a right to use force as possible unilaterally, and
is consistent with the idea that decisions on the use of force are vested primarily in the
Security Council, especially where time permits a diplomatic route.
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Standards, both procedural (justiciability) and substantive (test of necessity), are crucial if
we want to prevent a slippery slope and an ever-expanding concept of self-defense. The
US’ failure to present ‘overwhelming evidence’120 of the necessity to use force against
Iraq because of any imminent and immediate attack meant that the strike against Iraq fell
far short of the those standards that have evolved out of institutional practice and norm.
C. Trusteeship and Good Faith
The question that I want to confront is the extent to which it can be said that institutional
rules allow individual countries to retain a residual, secondary ability to act in the event
that the Security Council is stymied and unable to make a decision. This is particularly
important in light of the William Taft’s open-ended assertion that “the president may, of
course, always use force under international law in self-defense.”121 I suggest that they
may be such a right but it a very limited one which does not apply in the case of Iraq.
This is what I call the trusteeship analogy.122 In short, what the trusteeship analogy argues
is that the Charter is not only a contract between member states inter se, or a constitution,
but is in fact also an instrument of trust, where nations vest the responsibility of collective
security in the hands of the Security Council, giving up a hitherto core element of foreign
policy (the ability to use force for political gain).123 Where this trust is not exercised in
good faith, member states, as beneficiaries of that trust, retain a residual power to revoke
the trust, thereby denying that the Council holds power anymore, or they are entitled to
enforce it by themselves. Three reasons may be forwarded in support of this proposition:
the Charter itself, institutional practice, and sheer commonsense.
Article 2(2) states that all members shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by
them in accordance with the Charter. There is no reason why this does not apply to
Security Council members. The reference to “good faith” is, of course, language familiar
to trust lawyers. It describes a relationship of exclusive loyalty between the fiduciary (the
120
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Security Council) and the principals (the member states). The concept of loyalty in a
fiduciary relationship extends beyond our everyday understanding of what loyalty means;
instead, it conveys a very specific obligation to carry out the purposes expressed in the
trust instrument (the Charter) without personal profit, or as we say in international law
speak, vested interest. This means that the Security Council is obligated to make
decisions that are in the best interests of those who empowered it in the first place. Where
the trust is breached, there is no more relationship that holds the scheme of collective
security together, and the power to use force results back to the member states.
Article 24 then goes on to explicate the relationship between Security Council members
and UN member states as such:
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying
out its duties under this responsibility, the Security Council acts on their
behalf.
The facial words of the Article appear to be unambiguous support for my proposition.
Firstly, the act of conferring responsibility suggests that a concomitant right resided in the
person vesting that power. You cannot delegate an authority without having it in the first
place. Therefore, Art 24 recognizes that individual nations had a pre-existing right to use
force, which has now been delegated to the Security Council. Secondly, what is
authorized is not exclusive responsibility for ensuring prompt and effective action in the
maintenance of peace and security, but only “primary responsibility.”124 Where the
Security Council acts, and is able to act, it has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.125
However, where it fails to act, or unable to act, a secondary responsibility opens up to
those who can or are willing, be it the General Assembly or individual nations
themselves. Thirdly, Art 24 makes it clear that in the exercise of its responsibility, the
Security Council acts, at all times, on behalf of – and therefore for the benefit of –
member states. The metaphorical analogy to a trust is therefore complete. There is a
vesting of a power in a trustee, which exercises that power in accordance with certain
standards enumerated in the trust instrument. The trustee remains, at all times,
accountable to the principals, who reserve an authority to act where the trustee does not.
There is strong evidence that this was the intention behind the idea of collective security.
In fact, at San Francisco, France proposed that “should the Council not succeed in
reaching a decision, the members of the organization reserve to themselves the right to
act as the may consider necessary in the interest of peace, right and justice.”126 While this
may not have been adopted in the final draft of the Charter, Articles 2(2) and 24 do carry
an implicit understanding that the Security Council was not a power unto itself, but
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derived it from member nations, for the benefit of them. The very idea of collective
security is to get countries to forfeit the use of force in exchange for more powerful
countries to police international peace and security. In 1999, in his report to the General
Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, somewhat surprisingly, warned that:
The Charter requires the Council to be the defender of the common
interest, and unless it is seen to be so in an era of human rights,
interdependence and globalization, there is a danger that others could seek
to take its place.127
What Kofi Annan meant by “others” taking the place of the Council is unclear, but I
think it does allude to the fact that the Council is beholden to the international
community, rather than – as it may be thought – the other way around.128
Institutional practice has also recognizes this principle. In 1950, America, frustrated by
the deadlock in the Security Council over deployment of troops in Korea because of the
Soviet Union, went to the General Assembly, arguing that it was crucial not to leave the
United Nations impotent. The General Assembly voted 52-5 and adopted what is now
referred to as the “Uniting for Peace” resolution,129 which authorizes the General
Assembly to call an emergency special session to recommend collective measures where
the Security Council is paralyzed, as long as seven Council members, or a majority of
UN members, request such a session. The Uniting for Peace resolution has now been
used during the Suez crisis, and the deployment of UN military action in Congo. In the
Certain Expenses Case, the International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion,
confirmed the legality of the resolution by reasoning that the implication in giving the
Council “primary responsibility” was that the General Assembly retained “secondary”
responsibility that could be exercised when the former was stymied.130
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Understandably, such practice never went as far as acknowledging that individual
countries also retained this secondary right. However, by suggesting that the General
Assembly could act where the Security Council could not, it recognized that the latter’s
authority and mandate derives from the democratic will of the Assembly. It is not much
of a leap to argue that ultimate power comes from the individual states themselves (albeit
acting collectively in the Assembly). Also, where there is still recourse to diplomatic
channels like the General Assembly, this is, of course, the preferred route. But in the
world of politics, the General Assembly is not itself immune from the possibility of a
deadlock, or a situation where the requisite majority cannot be reached.131 In such cases,
individual nations retain a right to act unilaterally.
Indeed, while there has never been an explicit endorsement of my theory in institutional
practice, there have been occasions that seem to suggest, implicitly, that the failure of the
Security Council to promptly authorize action in what are intuitively compelling
circumstances lends legitimacy to what may otherwise be a technical violation of the law.
For example, in a Security Council debate on NATO’s actions, Slovenia appears to have
justified NATO’s actions by pinning the blame on the failure of the Council to act in
concert in what was undeniably a massive humanitarian crisis. In other words, she argued
that the inability of the Council to fulfill its role nullified the apparent illegality of
NATO’s action:
We regret the fact that not all permanent members were willing to act in
accordance with their special responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security under the United Nations Charter. Their
apparent absence of support has prevented the Council from using its
powers to the full extent and from authorizing the action which is
necessary to put an end to the violations of its resolutions.132
Slovenia is factually correct.133 But what is more significant is the recognition that
individual countries, or coalitions, can act outside of Council authorization without
reprisal where there is an expectation or knowledge that the Council will not, or is
unable, to authorize the action despite the practical necessity of the situation.
The last basis on which I propose this trusteeship analogy is commonsense. Kofi Annan
put it in stark terms, when he asked:
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To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is
the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might
ask, not in the context of Kosovo but in the context of Rwanda, if, in those
dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had
been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not receive
prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside
and allowed the horror to unfold?134
The instinctive answer must be a resounding no. Sometimes, countries may refuse to act
for reasons wholly unconnected with the ground situation. Domestic politics may play a
role; international alliances may influence; or occasionally a country may face a unique
threat that no other country can appreciate. America, for instance, will always remain
more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than, say, France will ever be, and as a result, may
feel more justified in preempting the threat Iraq could pose in the future than France
would. In such circumstances, it may well be necessary to understand that countries can,
and should, have a residual right to act where there is a compelling reason to, and where
there is paralysis in the system.
I do not mean to suggest that every veto can be circumvented in this way. This would
render the system of checks-and-balances within the UN structure nugatory. There will
need to be evidence of bad faith, or at least a reckless disregard for their duties in
ensuring prompt and effective action, in order to employ the trusteeship argument. It is
beyond the scope of this essay to examine the specific circumstances under which the
trusteeship analogy can invoked,135 but I do want to point out that apart from institutional
safeguards, member states are also particularly vulnerable to domestic and international
criticism by the international media, which has also been an extremely powerful weapon
against reckless leaders bent on ignoring the general prohibition against unilateral use of
force based on spurious grounds. What the BBC did to British Prime Minister Tony
Blair’s domestic popularity,136 and the inquiry he now faces over charges of deceiving
Parliament should not be forgotten in a hurry. Even President Bush’s popularity has
dipped significantly after the Iraqi war.137 This political counterbalance is important
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because my argument, admittedly, places the initial power to decide when there has been
bad faith in the hands of the very countries who want to use force unilaterally.138
Iraq seems a simple case to decide on this point. The strike came at a time when the UN
and the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors were engaged in on-site searches
for weapons of mass destruction. Given this, it cannot be said that UN was completely
inadequate in carrying out its primary duty. The Security Council can, of course, delegate
this discretion if it so wishes by explicit terms. This, however, was not the case in Iraq.
The US and the UK have consistently argued that the mandate to use force under 678,
revived by 1441139 were vested in individual members because 1441 made no mention of
a need for a further resolution before force could be used, and that all that was required
was “discussion.” The ambiguous wording of the resolution was no doubt a political
compromise, which if anything, was designed to defer or stop, and not to authorize the
invasion of Iraq. Furthermore the Council did explicitly reserve judgment by remaining
“seized of the matter” and also clearly stated that it would convene to “consider the
situation” after a report had been submitted by the inspectors. Saying that it would
consider the situation means exactly that: that it would decide what to do next. To suggest
that “consider” meant there was no obligation to seek authorization is a twisted way of
interpreting strikingly plain words and runs against the grain of our discussion above. The
entire architecture of the UN was one of collective security and collective decisionmaking. While concessions to practicality are necessary, they must be allowed only in
very discrete and limited exceptions.140
VII.

Background Theories

We now know that the institutional rules – gathered from text, history, practice and norm
– do not provide a basis for the attack on Iraq. Our next step is to ask if those rules could
possibly have developed in way that is out-of-step with the UN’s founding principles. If
so, we will need to trim, shear and align those rules so as to be consistent with these
larger moral aspirational values. In this section, we will test those institutional rules
against the three major premises of the UN: its role in checking abuses of power, its role
in protecting the sovereignty of nations, and its role in alleviating humanitarian crises.
A. Law as a Side-Contraint on Power
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The award of the centennial Nobel Peace Prize to the United Nations was
a fitting recognition of its role as an instrument for making and
maintaining peace. As the Nobel Committee put it, .the only negotiable
route to global peace goes by way of the United Nations.141
The United Nations, if anything, remains a potent symbol of a nation’s place in a
community of nations.142 Its Charter is almost universally accepted. That countries such
as India – who could probably do without the UN – and others such as Syria, Libya and
Sudan – well-known violators of international law – all seek to justify their actions in
relation to the Charter seems particularly significant. The fact is that countries to a large
extent do believe there are limits to the exercise of their power, and that the law as
embodied by the Charter (however malleable or uncertain) is a guide to that. The
rationale behind this is summarized as such:
It is tempting to pick and choose which international rules the United
States wants to uphold. But forsaking the rules of the road can backfire for
us to invoke them against others.143
It is therefore the uncertainty of what the future may hold that provides the greatest
incentive for countries to abide the law. But what happens when there’s a country like the
United States, who is not only a superpower, but what some might call, a hyperpower?
Can they bend the rules? Should they? It may serve us well to remember that the United
Nations was, really, an American creation. And it was created in 1945, after the war,
when America was the only Allied Power to remain relatively unscathed. Its economy
was half the world’s total, its army the strongest, and in many senses, one may argue that
its global dominance was much greater then than it is now. Yet its leaders thought it fit
that they should construct a multilateral institution as the primary mechanism for
ensuring America’s and the world’s security. In the words of President Truman, “We all
have to recognize—no matter how great our strength—that we must deny ourselves the
license to do always as we please.”144 The UN envisages a system of collective security,
and the laws expressed should be consistent with that vision, and insofar as it is possible,
not to make exceptions for powerful countries, or allow loopholes that can be exploited in
the unilateral discretion of countries. That international law generally abhors the use of
force is well stated here:
Malaysia fully subscribes to the fundamental principle of the paramount
need to preserve the sanctity of the Charter of the United Nations.
Malaysia underlined clearly that any conflict should be resolved through
dialogue and political negotiations and not by the use of force. Force, if at
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all necessary, should be a recourse of last resort and it should be
sanctioned by the Security Council.145
It is therefore evident that the United Nations, as imperfect as some may criticize it to be,
continues to play an important role in defining or at least lending legality and legitimacy
to state action; and that however we interpret the Charter, it should be consistent with this
value. One of the biggest worries about the invasion of Iraq is that while we may
instinctively agree that it is good to get rid of an evil dictator with a large arsenal of
weapons, this may come at the price of dismantling a system of international law that –
on balance – has worked to preserve stability and predictability particularly as a result of
keeping in check abuses of power by larger, more militarily advanced nations. The
institutional rules – requiring procedural and substantive standards, together with a strict
prohibition on the use of force with few exceptions – as a means of achieving the end of
constraining abuse of power, are thus consistent.
B. Law as Protecting Sovereignty
It is quite possible, of course, to envisage a system of collective security not based on a
premise of non-intervention; the United Nations would be some kind of a supra-national
organization that would organize the affairs of member states, from the political to
economics. But the Charter clearly spells out this was not the intention. Art 2(1) says the
Organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members, and the
real heart of this is captured in Art 2(7) suggesting that the United Nations is not
authorized to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. To put
this in perspective, this is about the only provision in the Charter that explicitly limits the
mandate of the Security Council. It must be readily apparent that, if anything, the law
embodied in the Charter is meant to protect this right to sovereignty. Sovereign equality
is at the heart of the UN system, with an essentially democratic General Assembly.
While, as with any large organization, there must be leadership (in the form of the
Security Council), the General Assembly is not without its powers, and in fact has made
important recommendations including the innovation of Chapter 6½, which has become
one of the core operations on the UN Agenda today. In essence, the principle of
sovereign equality is sometimes called the ‘minimum content’146 of international law.
There are possibly three reasons why the concept of sovereign equality is particularly
revered in international law. The first derives from the idea that international law should
only control aspects of governance that has a direct effect on others. Political decisions
made for, and directly affecting one’s citizens, should not be subject to an overriding
jurisdiction. It would render national governments practically powerless. But perhaps
more than that, it seems particularly perverse that an unelected Council should sit in
judgment of decisions made by individual states that are often context specific. The
second reason is simply instrumental. It is “an essential political and legal prerequisite for
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the maintenance of international peace and stability in international law and international
political, economic, social, humanitarian and cultural relations.”147 Territorial boundaries
are important because it is a means to order international society. The third reason is that
it confirms and protects the formal status of weak nations, giving them an equal standing
in the eyes of international law, and granting advantages in multilateral decision making
processes they would otherwise not have.148
As much as equal sovereignty is a crucial concept in international law, it is not absolute.
Art 2(7) makes it clear that the domestic jurisdiction exception is itself not to prejudice
the enforcement powers under Chapter VII. Therefore, when an act, purported to be
within a country’s domestic jurisdiction, rises to the level of a breach of international
peace or aggression, the Charter allows action to be taken against such a country. So if a
country amasses weapons of mass destruction, it cannot hope to escape international
censure simply by invoking the domestic jurisdiction exception. This was expressly
recognized in the Corfu Channel Case:
We can no longer accept sovereignty as an absolute and individual right of
every State, as used to be the old law under the individualist regime,
according to which States were bound only by rules they accepted. Today,
owing to social interdependence and to the predominance of the general
interest, the States are bound by many rules that are not ordered by their
will. The sovereignty of States have now become an institution, an
international social function of a psychological character, which has to be
exercised in accordance with international law.149
While this statement goes a bit too far in suggesting that we can impose obligations
without the consent of states, it certainly carries the argument that sovereignty is not
absolute very lucidly. To investigate what the boundaries of these obligations are, is
beyond the scope of this essay150 (although we will investigate one such obligation in the
next section, namely, human rights) but it is sufficient for our purposes to realize that
equal sovereignty is both vital yet not absolute. While on first glance, this underlying
value may appear to be a basis on which the Iraqi strike can be justified, an important part
in keeping this balance between the right to sovereignty and the need to intervene to
prevent abuse of sovereignty is that the decision to intervene is, wherever possible,
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carried made by the Security Council and not unilaterally. If one country could decide the
sovereignty of another, that would destroy any meaningful existence of this concept.
Thus, the Bush Doctrine, which underlines the attack on Iraq, threatens the basic fabric of
state sovereignty by proclaiming the United States as the sole arbiter of the fate of other
nations. Furthermore, the idea of sovereignty operates on the principle of reciprocity. A
state may only interfere in another’s if the latter has violated some norm which creates a
practical necessity for the retaliation. This is why the self-defense exception is consistent
with sovereignty. This is also precisely the reason why this exception is as limited as it is,
and an open-ended right to prevent future threats opens the door too wide. Hence the
conclusion arrived at in Part VI is consistent with the UN’s role to police the sovereign
integrity of all countries.
C. Law as Protecting Human Rights
What have been the reasons for which have prompted the changes in the
matter of subjects of international law, with regard both to international
rights and to international duties? These causes have been numerous and
manifold. They have included, with reference to the recognition of the
individual as a subject of international rights, the acknowledgement of the
worth of human personality as the ultimate unit of all law; the realization
of the dangers besetting international peace as the result of denial of
fundamental human rights…151
Article 1 of the Charter states, as one of the purposes of the UN, the respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms. The principle is easy enough to understand, but the
substantive content of that means is highly controversial. Indeed, the Charter does not
purport to suggest where this right derives, whether from natural law or political
philosophy, or somewhere else. It is simply there, and has become one of the most
formidable challenges confronting international lawyers today. The question is not so
much whether human rights (whatever its content) should be upheld, but the extent to
which force may be used to stop the abuse of human rights. It is a particularly thorny
issue because countries often claim that human rights are not universal and their status
should therefore be left to the determination of national governments. Yet, Art 2(7) does
contemplate that the Security Council can trump the domestic jurisdiction exception if
such abuses can properly be said to fall within the categories of a breach of peace, threat
to peace, or act of aggression.152 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan spelt out the
dilemma as such:
Recognition that many States have serious and legitimate concerns about
intervention does not answer the question I posed in my report, namely, if
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humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to
gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept
of our common humanity?153
While the definitions of threat to peace, breach of peace and act of aggression are not
clear – indeed one seldom makes a distinction between them – it is, I think, obvious, that
the extent of the human rights situation must be such as to rise to a level where
sovereignty should no longer be able to interpose itself as an impenetrable barrier
between the individual and the greater society of all humanity.154 In other words, there
must not only be a quantitatively significant humanitarian situation, but there should be
something qualitativelydifferent. A mere denial of certain human rights for instance
should not be enough to override the domestic jurisdiction exception. If it was sufficient,
it would render that exception practically toothless since every domestic political
decision always has the potential to be of international concern. The absence of a national
welfare system may seem to many Europeans as a violation of fundamental human rights.
Yet surely this alone cannot justify a military campaign against a country that does not
have welfare. If we look back on the cases where humanitarian intervention was
endorsed, explicitly or impliedly, there has always been the presence of something else.
For example, in South Africa, the regime was being aggressive to its neighbors.155 And in
Kosovo, it is at least arguable that not only was the humanitarian disaster spreading to
other countries, but Milosevic had violated a right to self-determination of the Kosovars
by dissolving the province’s autonomous status and later on, its government.156 In
contrast, despite the wide abuses by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, the regime
continued to be recognized by the General Assembly until 1998. The abuse of women’s
rights by the Taliban in Afghanistan was of no import until it was clear they were also
harboring terrorists.
Most of the time, a genocide or humanitarian disaster will be accompanied by other
factors, but where it is not, it should not be presumed that there is legal basis for action.
Thus, the “purely humanitarian” intervention is a myth. In truth, while the Charter does
call on member states to respect human rights, it does not authorize the violation of
sovereignty unless it qualitatively rises to a level where the national/international
distinction can no longer be maintained. This analysis answers the latest justification
offered by the White House in defense of its attack on Iraq (having failed to evince any
evidence of Saddam’s weapons stockpile.) Alone, human rights abuses do not justify an
invasion, and certainly do not justify a unilateral attack. While this may seem unusually
harsh, it does provide a necessary and manageable line at which to say that if we go
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further, there is no principled way in which we can not go even further down the slippery
slope.
VII. Conclusion
The case study of Iraq presents the classic problems in reconciling the previously glaring
tensions between adhering to the words of the Charter (“the law”) and our moral
persuasions (“legitimacy”). It questions if there is a way to balance the need to insure
against an artificial and over-expansive reading of the Charter with the necessity of
interpreting it in light of modern situations. The interpretative model that is elucidated
above does exactly that. We first ask if the words are so particularized as to prevent
further inquiry. If they are, then the framers of the Charter may be presumed to have
intended that provision to be solely denotative. Conversely, where there is ambiguity, or
where it is clear that the words require further interpretation, we can assume the framers
intended that provision to be connotative. Our interpretation then begins by constructing
institutional rules by examining how history, norms and practice have interpreted the text.
The answers generated are then tested against more general background theories that
provide form the normative values underlying the Charter.
In the case of Iraq, our institutional rules suggest that the US’ actions are illegal. They
flatly undermine the general prohibition on the use of force, and fail to fall within the
exception in Art 51 (self-defense) because it does not clear the justiciable, substantive
requirement of necessity by demonstrating the imminence and immediacy of an attack. It
also does not meet the exception contemplated in Art 24 (the trusteeship principle) since
the facts show that the UN was not neglecting its primary obligation, and none of the
UN’s resolutions on Iraq indicate that the responsibility for any military action was
delegated to individual members. These institutional rules are uncontradicted by any of
the background theories. They are consistent insofar as they promote the aims of the UN,
which are to prevent abuse of power and protect sovereignty. While the UN is also
designed to deal with humanitarian crises, we have come to understand that the crisis in
question must be qualitatively different from a mere abuse of human rights within the
four walls of a given country.
This fit between institutional rules and background theories extinguishes the need to think
in terms of binary dichotomies of law and legitimacy. By understanding that
interpretation is a cumulative exercise in constitutive association between the text, norms,
history, institutional rules and background theories, we are able to confront these difficult
situations in a more holistic fashion that pays attention to the textual constraints of the
law but recognizes the need to accommodate the more flexible demands of our moral
instincts.157
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